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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND PERIPHERY STATE RELATIONS

Birol ·A. Yesilada

INTRODUCTION

Six members in 1952, nine in 1973, teh in 1980,.and
twelve in 1986: the European
..
,
.

Community (EC) is the world's largest trading bloc that brings together more than 325
million people. 1 The twelve member states of the EC are BeJgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. Today, the entire world is watching with great interest and concern as the
EC moves rapidly to integrate the economies of its member states, through Project 1992 and
recent treaties signed ~uring the 199-1 Maastricht Summit on Economic. and Monetary Union
and Political Union,. and expan~ its influence in global affairs. These decisions concern the
future security considerations of the EC as Europe is experiencing dramatic changes. This
paper only d~s with·the economic side of EC's security considerations.
The effort;s of the EC states to ~ntegrate their economies have caught. the attention of
several countries in the periphery of the·Community: the EFTA states, new i1emocracies in
Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, Russia, Ukraine, and th~ non-member Mediterranean
countries (NMBCs). Almost all of these countries have shown interest in improving their

1

1t should be noted that this claim to world's largest trading area may be fast changing as
the EC and EFTA complete the European Economic Area (EBA). lfntil, agreements on BEA
are finalized, however, the EC is the largest trade area in the world. Throughout this paper,
the terms EC and Community will be used interchangeably.

2

relations with the Community, and some of them have applied for full membership in the

.

,

EC. Turkef applied for membership in 1987 and Austria followed suit in 1988. Since then,
Cyprus and Malta submitted their applications in 1990. Finally, Sweden.followed in 1991 as
part of its evaluation of the BEA negotiations. Others, such as Hungary, Poland, and
Norway, may soon apply as w~ll.
In EC-periphery country relations it is crucial to note that the Community has
associational or co-operative trade agreements with most of_ the countries on its periphery and
similar agreements are to be signed with the emerging democracies of East-central Europe.
_ Furthermore, the EC and EFTA (Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland) agreed to create a trade region, larger than the EC, known as the European
Economic Area (EBA). The speed at which the EC is moving al~ng with economic
integration, expanding its economic and political influence in the region, and the reciprocal
attention it receives from the peripheral states has not been unnoticed by the other important
powers _of the world. A_lready, the United States is trying to create a counter trade area in
the Americas and Japan is working on a similar plan in Asia.
Currently two sets of issues dominate the EC agenda: deepening of integration and
the expansion (widening) of the Community membership.2 While these two sets of issues
may seem to be mutually exclusive, they are interrelated in the sense that the EC officials
link the future success of economic integration to the Community's ability to'expand into ·
additional markets. In a similar fashion, the periphery states are interested in joining the EC

2

David M. Wood and Birol A. Yesilada, "European Integration in the 1980s and 1990s,"
Business in the Contemporary World, vol. 3, no. 3 (Spring): 93.

3
t<;> benefit from the expected economic benefits of integration.

Deepening of Integration in the EC
The "deepening" of economic integration in the European Community is a result of
important global changes. First, the decline in US hegemony undermined the geopolitical
security considerations on which the EC had relied since its establishment. 3

As the US' s

required hegemonic role, globally as well as regionally, eroded during the 1960s and 1970s
no other credible candidate from among the EC members emerged to take on such a
leadership role. Second, the demise of the Bretton Woods system occurred at a time when
complex interdependence began to characterize relations among the member states. 4

During

the 1970s, the EC states tried to cope with global economic turbulence by adopting nationspecific recovery policies. Such efforts not only failed to bring economic recovery to the
Community but also contributed to Europessimism--stagnation in economic- integration.
During the early 1980s, the EC members concluded that if the Community was to
regain its lost competitiveness in industrial productivity, above the United States and Japan,
th~re was no alternative but to create a true common market. That is, if the EC was to hold
its own and regain lost momentum, it had to provide for economies of scale under a truly
integrat¢ and interdependent economy. As a result of pressures from industry, the EC
• officials led by the President of the EC Commission Jacques Delors, proposed a plan to

3

Wood and Yesilada, "European Integration." pp. 91-92.

4

Complex interdependence refers to interstate relations defined by Robert 0. Keohane and
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed, (Glenview, Illinois: Scott,
Foresman/Little Brown, l989), Ch. 2.

4

achieve this goal. This was the White Paper, published in June 1985, which set out the
necessary program for a Europe-wide deregulation of industry and finance designed, together
with a clear time table for action. ~ubsequently in a historic move, the member states signed
the Single European Act in Luxembourg in February 1986 which represented the first major
amendments to the Rome Treaties of 1957. The Act detailed 282 measures (known as
Project 1992) designed to eliminate restrictive policies and lift non-tariff barriers by the end
of 1992.
There are sound economic reasons behind the Community's desire to complete Project
1992. According to a study by Paolo Cecchini expected economic benefits from this project
are:

1.

The potential economic gain to the Community as a whole from the single market is,
estimated to be in the region of 200 billion European Currency Units (ECU, 1 ECU =
1.28 - 1.36 $US) or more, in 1988 prices. This is equal to a 5 percent increase in the
EC's Gross Domestic Product (GDP).

2.

Total savings from the abolition of administrative formalities and border controls is
estimated to be around 13-25 billion ECUs.

3.

Savings from increasing the scale of production of manufactured products will be around 2
percent ofEC's GDP.

4.

Those savings will deflate consumer prices by an average of 6 percent while contributing
to output, employment, and improvement of living standards.

5.

Integration will provide 2-5 million new jobs, depending on the macroeconomic policies
accompanying the 1992 program.

5
6.

It will boost the EC's trade with other countries on a scale of around. one percent· of ·
GDP. 5

These findings ·of Cecchini are considered conservative by Richard Baldwin of
. ·Columbia University. He estimates that the net long-term effects of Project 1992 coµld
be as much as five times greater than the estimates ·of Cecchini. 6
.

"

Since 1986, considerable progress has been made towards the completion of
Project -1992. By August 1991, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
.

'

'

~pproved-198 of the required single-market directives. The directives will take effect
· when they ~e approved by the national parliaments of the member countries: In
accordance with these directives, the EC eliminated many physical barriers to trade . ·.
amont the members. At the same time, financial barriers are quickly disappearing,· The
.

.

results can· be seen in the increase in i~tra-EC trade as. percent of total EC· trade:·· 54 ·
percent.in 1985, 58 percent in 1988, and 60·percent in 1989. Also,. th~re has been a ·
growing urge to merge business across the Community. According to the Economist:
the number of mergers and acquisitions made by Europe's 1,000 leading companies leapt from
'

.

'

300 in 1986-87 to 622 in 1989-90. Many of these m~~gers were nationai. · Buf in the 12
- months .to the end of June 1990, the number of cross~border mergers and acquisitions in
Europe exceeded domestic ones for the first time. 7

The Europ~ Commission also reports that the number of joint ventures involving

· 5

For a detailed dis~ussion of these ·benefits ~ee Eaolo Cecchina, The European Challenge
1992: The Benefits of a Single Market, (Aldershot, .United Kingdom: Wildwood House for the
Commission of the European Communities, 1989).
6

Richard Baldwin, "The Growth Effec~s of 1992," Economic Policy, no ..9 (October, 1989).

7

Economist, December 7, 1991:

\,
6
companies from two different EC members increased f~om 16 in 1986-87 to 55 in 1989-90.
Furthermore, during the first period, there were 88 large-scale mergers which created new
companies with an turnover of more· than 5 billion ECUs. During the latter period, the
number for 1arge-scale mergers was 257 ~ 8
The relative success of their-efforts at establishing~- true common market has, in tum,
provided the_ EC leaders _the incentives 'to~ard achieving Economic arid Mon~tary Union (EMU) and Political Union· (PU),. The~e steps have been taken- with the objective of gaining
ecoriomic stability in the EC and increasing the Community's status and prestige in world
,,

affairs. The proposal for EMU was-articulated in the 1988 Delors Plan which was later
adopted· at the 1989 Madrid Summit. - ·
The 1988 Delors Plan ~cufated the proposal for EMU that emphasized coordination
of ecpnomic and monetary policies and, ultimately, the establishment of a central banking
system and a common currency for the EC states. The heads of government of the EC states
accepted the idea of the E~ during the 1989 Madrid Summit and also pushed forth the id~a
of political union. Furthermore, as the rest of the wo~ld looked in amazement at what was
occ'!rri~g in the EC, and tried to assess the potential impact of ~roject 1992 on world trade
.

.

\

.

. and welfare, the -~ommunity-members signed other historic agreements during the
Maastricht Summit in December 1991.
,

,

The EMU treaty outlines a timetable to complete economic integration and the
European- Monetary Institute will be formed by 1994 to coordinate monetary policies of
member states. This institute will later become the European Ce~tral B~k by July 1998.

8

Economis_t, January 25! 1992, pp. 49-50.

.7

Finally, by January 1999, the ecu 'will become a common currency for the EC (Britain,
however, is given the tight not to adopt the ecu even if the other EC states do). 9 The
agreement on political union is far less ambitious than the EMU treaty and falls far short of
calling for a federal formula for the Community. It states that the European Council will sit
astride three pillars known as the European Union. The first pillar is the old Community
with its new EMU orie.ntation and responsibilities. The second pillar is for coordination of
foreign and security policies. And the third is• for cooperation on such issues as immigration
and policing. The latter two pillars are to be intergovernmental entities over which the EC
institutions (Commission, parliament, court, etc) will have less control than in the first
area. 10 In summary, the Maastricht Treaty broadened the range of issues that require
cooperation of the twelve member states but did not significantly expand the powers of the
commission and the parliament. The Commission can now make proposals on industrial
policy, visas, education, health, culture, and consumer protection. It can also participate in
discussions on foreign policy and domestic security. The Parliament, on the other hand, has
· a veto power on the single market legislation, policies on the environment, and research and
development policies. 11

EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

Expanding the membership of the EC is beneficial to the current members and to

9

"EUROPE/Document No. 1752/1753. 20 December 1991.

10

Economist, January 25, 1992.

11Ibid.

8

those peripheral countries. that aspire. to· join the Community. The EC js interested in
expansion because this ~ould enhance Community influence ih Europe. ·As previously
mentioned, those wt10 want to join the Community do so·_because of the expected ecconomic
benefits of _Project 1992.
l}

•

~

The view of EC officials on expansion is reflected in an opinion paper prepared by
.

~,

the Economic. and Soc~al Committee of the EC on January 25, 1989: This report specifically
_states that the Community is in a global competition with the United States and Japan:
even once it is reinforced by establishment of a barrier-free internal market, the Community
will not be able to withstand competition from· the two main strategic areas of Amenca and
Asia

unles~ it expands its economic area

and market. To create this strategic ~uropean area,

the C_ommunity will have to tum to its neighbors: European Free Trade Association (EFTA)~
· Eastern Europe, and the Mediterranean. In this latter region, the Community must rapidly
make up for lost time: the Mediterranean is now a focus of US and Japanese trade,
investment, economic-aid, and above all, technological "colonisation. "12

The recent .activism 9fthe EC officials in providing economic assistance and
leadership to post~Communist countries of East-central Europe, the push for economic
.

.

.

cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin, and a peace initiative in Yugoslavia all support the
arguments of the Economic and Social Council. Certainly, the periphery states have .. .
indicated their desire to cooperate with the Community, either as associate members or full
members of the EC. While the EC is eager to establish associational cooperative trade
agreements With these· states it is less willing to grant

12

foll membership to just any~ne. In

EC Economic and Social Council, "Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy of the European
Community,"·OfficiatJoumal of the European Communities, ~o. C221/16 (January 25, 1989),
· par. 2.5.
.
·
.

9
I

fact, the membership applications of Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, and Turkey are
· postponed until important progress is made on "d~pening" of integration in the Community.

Conditions for Membership
'

There are two requirements for membership in the EC: a country should be
European and it must have a developed economy comparable to the member states'
economies. In addition, there is a political requirement that aims at promoting democracy in
the region. While the Treaties of Rome did not specify any explicit political conditions for
membership in the EC, the Birkelbach Report of 1962 stated. that "only states which
guarantee on their territories truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental human
rights and freedoms can become members of our Community. "13 Since its.adoption by the
EC, this report has been critical in determining the members' relations with other states.
In its relations with periphery countries, the EC tries to improve ties by establishing
association agreements for cooperation. There are two kinds of association or cooperation
agreements extended to non-member countries by the Community. 14

The first type

provides for foreign assistance and designated areas of trade between the EC and
non-member states. Countries in this category are not targeted for eventual accession to full
membership. Countries that benefit from the Lome Conventions and Global Mediterranean

13

As cited in Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization," in Transition
from Authoritarian Rule.: Comparative Perspectives, Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter,
and Laurence Whitehead eds., (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), p. 5.
14

Birol A. Yesilada, "The EC' s Mediterranean Policy," in The State of the European
Community: Policies, Institutions, and Debates in the Transition Years, Leon Hurwitz and
Christian Lequesne, eds., (Boulder and London: Reinner/Longman, 1991), pp. 360-361.

10
Policy are jn this category. The second type 9f association prepares non-members for
possible membership in the Comm~nity or the creation ofa customs union between the
nonmember state and the EC. Agreements with Austria, Cyprus, Malta, ~d Tu_rkey fall mt6
this category. As stated' earlier these COU!ltries have all applied for full membership in the
Community.

EC and EFTA Relations P~rhaps the best indication of the EC' s desire to expand its ~embei~hip and its .sphere
of influence is the current negotiations with EFTA countries to create the European
Economic Area (EBA). _The BEA idea dates back to 1984 when•it was first suggested at the
-joint EC-EFTA ministerial m~ting in Luxembourg. According to Rene Schwok:
the event that triggered the new development of the EEA ~as the speech of January 17, 1989,
by Jacques Delors

to the European Parliament in whicµ he proposed to EFTA "a n~w f~n11
of
'
'

association, with common decision making and administrative inst1bitions." At that time,
Jacques Delon; r~ctivated the ·EEA in .order to avoid the EC's historic mission-~political ,
.

union'-.:.peing endangered by neutral members. In January 1989, before the end of Communism·

~ Eµrope: Jac9ues Delors. was especially urientpusiastic about attempts by Austria, a neutral
· co~try, to apply for EC membership. 15

With the collapse of communism in Europe, concerns about neutral countries; impact

on EC s~urity poli~ies disappeared to a large extent and after 16 months of 'negotiations the
two comm~nities agreed to create the world's largest trading area, the EBA. The original
agreem¢nt, encompassing 19 European states and 380 million citizens, cal_led for free flow of

15

Ren~ S~hwok, "EC-,EFTA Re~ations," Ibid. p. 229.
i

11

capital, services, workf?rs and ·most goods throughout the BEA as of January 1, 1993--at the
time when the EC's common market would take effect. This new trade area would account
for 40 percent of world trade. However, the agreement has been sent back to the negotiation
table due to a reservation registered by the-EC Court of Justice. 16 The crucial concerns of
the Court centered on the proposed joint EC-EFTA tribunal to resolve certain EBA-related
disagreements. The agreement calls for 5 of the lfEC judges to sit.on the BEA court. This
raises the question whether the EC judges of the jointtribunal will still be allowed to rule on ·
an EC case if a similar case is already decided by the previous body.- The current
negotiations are attempting to resolve this problem.
In the context of greater European Community it is important to examine the
imJ,Jlicatioris of the BEA on European integration: ~FTA supports the BEA because it can
accelerate its integration into Proj~t 1992 and will provide the EFTA states-with better odds
· in becoming full members of the EC. For the EC, the BEA will increase its status and
-influence in Europe ·and expand its economic base and power. According to the origi.nal
agreement, products _originating 10 the EC and EFTA countries (with some restrictiops for
agricultural products,. fish, energy, coal and steel), will move freely throughout the new EE.A
as of January 1, 1993. At the same t~me,-both the EC and individual EFTA countries will
maintain
their individual tariff schedules for imports from third parties. Furthermore, the
.
EFTA countries would remain outside of EC's Com~on· Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The agreemen~ also specifies that EFTA will adopt'EC laws and rules on comp~tition,
anti-trust, abuse of dominant position, public procurement and state· aid, company

16

Eurocom, vol. 3, no. 11 (December, 1991).

12
regulations, consumer protection, education, environment, ·research and development, and
social policy. As a ~ontrol mechanism for compliance with these changes and also as a
judicial ·body to settle disputes the independent EC-EFTA tribunal will be established.
Furthermore, EFTA countries and the EC agreed to mutual recog])ition and freedom of
_movement of professionals throu~hout the EEA. One exception is Switzerland which has
very strict immigration law,s. This .country is given five years to comply with the_ above

requirements. 17
.While negotiations are continuing to resolve existing ambiguities in the agreement,
some EFTA -countries

are moving rapidly to register their applications for full membership in·

the EC. Sweden applied in 1991. Finland will,consider the issue .in SpJing 19_92 ..
Switzerland indicated that she wiU apply for membership and Austria· asked for the start of
negotiations to consider its application. Finally, Turkey, which applied for membership in
1987, signed a free trade agreement with EFTA countries on December 10, 1991 and
potentially improved its chances for eventual accession to full membership.

The EC and East-central Europe

Recent revolutions in East..,central Europe served as catalysts to modify radically EC's
policies toward this region. So.on after the collapse of communist regimes in East-central
Europe, the EC-officials initiated an economic reconstruction prqgram for the former
. communist states. The EC Commission played a leadiqg role in the organization of
irtte111ational assistance to restructure the economies of-.Poland and Hungary. This program,

. -

11

Eurocom, vol. 3,. No. 10 (November, 1991).

13
known as PHARE; expanded to include other East-central states as they abandoned
communism. The .scope of the restructuring prog~am also expanded from_ development credit
to cooperation and reconstruction. Finally, the EC went a step further and proposed a _
"global policy;" similar in- nature to the Global Mediterranean_ Policy, which emphasizes the importance of establishing mutual assqciational relationships with those of the East-central
European states. The prerequisites_ for establishing such relationships, on the part of the
East-central states, are progress on political democratization and economic reform~ toward a ·
market system. As Fran~oise de La Serre -explains "more than anything else, the expe~ence
the EC. has accumulated in terms of trade and cooperation policy with third countries or in
the field of operations (food aid, for example) has allowed it to ~ecome the privileged
interlocutor for eastern Europe. "18

·

Certainly, the EC has made substanti~ gains in this

area -in its competition for influence with Japan and the United States.
One year after -negotiations start~, the EC initiated association, or "European
Agreements/ with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. 19 : These_ 10-year agreements are
·designed to facilitate reform process in the three ·countries ·and to pave the :way for- eventual
accession to full membership in the EC. These agreements are similar in scope to the.
associational agreements which helped Greece, Portugal, and Spain to join\ the Community.
j

Furthermore, agreements with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland underline the EC's goal
in expanding its influence into East-central Europe.

18

Fran9oise de La Serre, "The EC and Central an~ Eastern Europe," in The State of the" _
European Community: Policies, Institutions, and Debates in -the Transition Years, Leon Hurwitz
and Christian Lequesne eds., (Boulder and London: Reinner/Longman, 1991), p. 310.
19

Eurocom, (December, 1991), p. 2.

14
The three agreements are similar in their structures but vary in content according to
the specific needs of each country. They emphasi~e the fact that Hungary and Poland are ·
more dependent on agricultural exports, and thus more vulnerable to EC's CAP restriction
than Czechoslovakia. Over time, these countries will adapt t}:leir administrative laws to
comply With Community legislation--particularly the competition laws. In the meantime, the
three countries will continue to receive financial assistance through the PHARE. program
until the end of 1992. Furthermore, the three -countries will receive Community assistance in
the following areas of common interest: product and safety standards, educational and
training programs, regional development, environmental protection, drug trafficking, ~d
transportation and telecommunications. 20 At the time of writing this paper, the EC is
negotiating other "European Agreements" with the Baltic States and there are signs that
future talks will take place with other East-central European countries.

It is important to realize, however, that recent developments in Yugoslavia complicate
EC's economic and political security policies in the region. Germany's unilateral decision to
recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and then force the EC to adopt the
German position as a Community policy, presents a dangerous precedent for foreign policy
making. While it is not the purpose of this paper to analyze in great detail the political
security issues of the EC, it is crucial to note that the behavior of the German government
added to instability in Yugoslavia and, more significantly, provided great uncertainities
regarding the Community's willingness to help stabilize the volatile Balkans. Furthermore,
German policy towards Croatia and Slovenia is not only effecting the Community's Balkan

2

°Ibid.

15
policy but also the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) because Yugoslavia is part of both
policy areas.

EC's Global Mediterranean Policy
'

The GMP has been the blueprint for the EC's relations with the non-member
Mediterranean Basin countries (NMBCs) since its adoption at the 1972 Paris summit.
Resembling the EC's Lome agreements, the GMP's primary purpose was to promote close
trade and financial relations between the Community and the NMBCs. This policy was a
crucial shift from the Community's bilateral relati?ns with each country of the region to a
multilateral approach where the Mediterranean basin was (reated as a single region.
During the last two decades, the GMP has experienced significant changes that
affected trade and other forms of cooperation between the EC and. NMBCs. The
membership of Greece, Portugal, and Spain in the EC further strained relations between the
two regions as these Mediterranean countries obtained advantageous positions vis-a-vis other
NMBCs. That is, the memberships of Greece, Portugal, and Spain negatively affected the
NMBCs relations with the Community. 21
In recent years, two important developments convinced Community officials to

21

For a detailed analysis of trade relations see Biro! A. Yesilada, "The EC's Mediterranean
Policy," pp. 361.-365; Roy Ginsberg, "The European Community and the Mediterranean," in
Institutions and Policies of the European Community, Juliet Lodge, ed., (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1983); Richard Pomfret, "The Impact of EEC Enlargement on Non-member
Mediterranean Countries' Exports to the EC," The Economic Journal, 91 (September, 1981);
and George Yannopoulos, "Prospects for the Manufacturing Exports of the Non-candidate .
Mediterranean Countries in a Community of Twelve," World Development, 12 (December,
1984).
.

16
re""examine the GMP. The first factor was Project 1992 and how it might further damage
NMBCs' trade_refations with the EC. And as mentioned earlier, the other issue-was the
competition in this region between the EC and its global rivals, namely the United States. and
Japan. The concerns· of the Community are reflected :in the speech of the vice-president of
the Brussels Commission, Frans H.J. J. Andriessen on April 25, 1990. In his speech
Andriessen underlined the growing Mediterranean character. of the EC and explained how
long-term ties between the Community and the Mediterranean Basirt-r<:!sulted in associational
.•

.

agreements with many countries of the region. However, these agreements have lagged
behind their original goals over the last 10~ 15 years .. Therefore, Andriessen argued, there
was a· n~ to readdress the GMP due to the ·fact that "increasingly closer geopolitical rather
than political links will· be forged between the Mediter-anean countries in the coming decades ·
[and that] the European Community will be involved in this process. "22 : The significance
of the Mediterranean Basin to the EC is also reflected in the address of Commissioner Abet
Matutes; member of the Commission with. special responsibility for the Mediterranean policy,
.
.
.
\
where he 'explained that the NMBCs are _the Community's third-largest customer and its
.

• fourth-largest supplier, providing 20 percent of its energy imports. 23
In light of these developments, the EC decided to revaluate its policy towards the
:Mediterranean :J3a~in ~d eliminate ·problems· that prevented progress of the original GMP of

22

Frans H.J.J. Andriessen, -"Europe at the Crossroads," presentation given at the 10th annual
Paul-Henri Spaak Lecture at Harvard University, April 25, 1990, pp. 11-12. '
23

~uropeari Commission, · "The Community's Mediterranean ·Policy: New Initiatives,"
summary·of an address gtven by Matutes to the symposium on human movements in the-western ·
Mediterranean, Barcelona, November 9, 1989 ..

17
1972. The opinion paper of the Economic and Social Cotincil called for the establishm.ent of
a truly interdependent relationship by adopting a joint development strategy. ·Specifically, the
Council called for:
1.

Solving the competition problems that will be caµsecJ by the gradual opening-up to
NMBCs' agricultur.ll and industrial .exports.

2·.

.'. Reformulating EC policies ori CAP, industry, research and development, energy,
-

,

transportation,
and regional
policy.
.
.
3.

The Community must iron out disparities between the south and the center-north of the
EC, providing the southem members a strat~gic role as a bridge between the economically
most advanced parts of the,EC and the dev~loping countries of the Mediterran~ Basin.

4.

To bring together the various parts of the Mediterranean by developing a proper transport
and co~unication network.

5.

Achieve complementary relations between the various industries of the two areas by
providing ihe NMBCs with access to innovation, advanced technologies, and allowing
them_ to tap into_local environmental and cultural resources ..

6.

Establish a truly "global" approach by disregarding pleas for special treatment from some
of the NMBCs which claim to have closer ties with the Community for one reason or
another.

7.

Harmonize the Gommunity's GMP with individual member states' polfcies to these
countries. 1n. this regard, ·the C,ommunity should play· a leadership role ..

.
8.

'

.

,

.

Provide increased f~ancial assistance to the NMBCs. 24

For the implementation of these policy recommendations, t,he Council called for a four-stage
program-:sort of a blueprint for the construction of the new Mediterr~ean Policy. ·These
steps are:
24EC.

Economic and Social Council, "Opinion on the Mediterranean Policy," par. 3.1-5.7.

18
{

1.

First stage which includes the adoption of a Community paper setting out general
guidelines for revitalizing the Mediterranean policy_. This means, approval by the Council·
of Ministers, following a· proposal from the Commission in .;:ooperation with the European
Parliament. Furthermore, this stage would involve the establishment of ·a Mediterran~
Cooperation Council:

2.

Second stage where the Mediterranean forum is established.. This inclµdes· preparation of
i

specific guidelines for sectoral policies, launching of major pilot development agreements,·
and coordination and support over member states' policies towards the region ..
3.

Third stage which involves the establishmeqt of a center or agency which will provide
technical support for the development agreements.

4.

Conclusion of the }!C~NMBCs joint development convention with the ·creation of. specific
institutions for the above purposes. 25

.

'

.

.

,

In accordance with the suggestions of the Economic and Social Council, the EC ·
Council of Ministers held policy discussion on the GMP and reaffirmed the Community's
desire to strengthen cooperation with the NMBCs. At the .end of this meeting, the Council
of Ministers called upon the EC Commission to submit ·to it specific proposals for the
implementation of the GMP. The Commission responded by proposing the following
guidelines:
1.

Supplying tech.meal support for economic, fiscal and financial reforms arid reducing the
social cost of structural adjustment, particularly improving food supply.
.

2.

'

-

Using the European Investment Bank or EEC finance bodies. to promote private investment

by means of joint venture operations.
3.

25

Choosing top priority sectors where more investment is needed (environment,

Ibid., par. 8.
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communications, anc;l extending the region's industrial network).
4.

Continuing access to the Common Market, particularly through tra"ditional farm trading
patterns, while improving access for industrial products.

5.

Involving these countries more closely in the aims of the Internal Market by promoting
.

.

aµd improving ~xch~ges of information on standardisation and technical harmonisation,
for instance.
6. ·

Improving the economic dialogue already established with .some countries in the fields of
agriculture, energy arid taxation ani:l extending the dialogue to regional organizations such
as the Arab Maghreb Union or the Arab C~operation Council. 26

It is evident tl}a:t the EC has recognized the failure of the initial Global Mediterranean
Policy of 1972 and is trying to revitalize it by making ·some crucial policy reorientation and
reformulation towards the Mediterranean Basin. Since the declaration of the above
documents, EC officials have been busy attempting to launch· a new regional cooperation in
the NMBCs. However, the efforts of EC officials are not without confusion-. Since their
entry into the Community, Spain; Portugal, and Greece have_ been actively involved in
determining EC policies towards· the ·NMBCs. In recent years, F:rance arid.Italy also entered.
',

this rape and added to the confusion. According to Alfred T~vias:
both Spain and--Portugal will try to maximize trade diversion in wine, fruit, and vegetables by
proposing modifications in the CAP, but not necessarily in the. highly visible Mediterranean
Policy. Both will strongly defend the principle of Community preference in agriculture, which
can only mean more protectionism against other Mediterran~ producers of fruit, vegetables,
and olive oil. All this implies a further raising of fences between the ·community and the
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Mediterranean Basin, a very dangerous strategy for the Community because of its energy
dependence on the area as well as the importance of the basin's market for European goods
and services. 27

The positions of the three newest members of the EC are indeed dangerous for the

"'
EC not only because of energy and market dependence
but also because of geopolitical
considerations. The recent Gulf crisis proved how important the region is for security
interests of the Community. The proposals of the Economic and Social Council and the EC
Commission are aimed at minimizing such problems. Their efforts seem to have produced
some results. Recently, the Mediterranean members of the EC, _led by the Italian Foreign
Minister Gianni De Michelis, called for the establishment of a Conference on Security and
'Cooperation in the Mediterranean. This idea is modelled after the Conference on Security
and Co-operation in Europe. The Italian .and Spanish officials fear that growing economic
and demographic disparity between the members and the NMBCs would be damaging to the
long· term interests of the EC. While they argue that such a conference should include all of
the eastern Mediterranean states, even extending to the Persian Gulf and Iran, the French
maintain that the cooperation needs to start with a more narrow focus--namely the Maghreb
(Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). Despite the appearance of some confusion over the GMP,
it is clear that Mediterranean Bas_in has once again became an important issue on the EC
•

agenda.
With regard to the GMP, events in Yugoslavia are once again presenting potential
problems for the EC states. The German decision to force de facto EC recognition of

27
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Slovenia and Croatia has given incentives for other Yugoslav states to seek independence.
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia have indicated their desire to become independent states.
Thus far, Bulgaria and Turkey have recognized the independence of Macedonia. If
Bosnia-Herzegovina declares its independence, Turkey will 1probably extend its recognition.
The EC, on the_ other hand, is less eager to recognize the independence of these states. In
the case of Macedonia, Greece is opposed to the very name of the new state because it
allegedly damages Greek culture and carries with it the potential threat to the territorial
sovereignty of Greece. 28 It is clear in this case that Greece will block EC recognition of
Macedonia as an independent state.
The problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina is somewhat more complex. This Yugoslav
republic has 1.9 million Muslims, 1.3 milion Serbs, and 800,000 Croats who have different
loyalties. The Serbs are asking for the creation of a Bosnian confederation of three
communities or they will declare their own independence if Bosnia-Herzegovina attempts to
become an independent state. The Croats are interested in joining Croatia. Muslims, on the
other hand, emphasize the indivisibility of the republic. However one looks at the situation
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is clear that the republic is the ethnic tinderbox of Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav army has been building up its presence in the area which houses 80 percent of
its weapons industries. 29

Faced with growing ·tension in the republic, the President of

Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, stated that if the Serbian or Croatian forces/irregulars
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begin a military campaign against the Muslims he will call upon Turkey's help. It is
interesting to note that this message was warmly received in Ankara. Such outcome would
undoubtely cause friction between some members of the EC and Turkey and, therefore,
damage the GMP.

CONCLUSIONS
The above analysis shows that expansion of the EC membership is inevitable for
several important factors. First, it is in strategic and economic interest of the Community to
maintain good relations with its periphery. Second, the EC needs to expand its economic
ba~e by absorbing new areas into its framework in order to compete with the United States
and Japan--not only in regional terms but also on a global scale. And third, the periphery
states are interest~ in attaining membership in the EC because economic integration in
Europe (Project !992 and Economic and Monetary Union) promi~es economic benefits to all
who are taking part in this process. In this regard, it is important to note that even those
countries which can not become a member of the Community, such as the ~on-European
'

states of the Mediterranean Basin, are interested in establishing associational agreements with
the EC. Such agreements will give these countries preferential treatment over other trade
· partners of the Community. However, expansion should not be expected to take place very
soon. .Before any new members are added .into the Community, substantial progress must be
made in the "deepening"_ of integration betw~n the 12 members. Given the ti~etable for
economic and monetary integration, it is probable that no new countries will become full
members of the EC until the end of this century. Furthermore, the Community needs to sort

23
out the complex problems of the Balkans arid provi~e sound leadership in the process before
the Balkan' conflicts damage, or '.'Balkanize" so:-to-speak, the Community's economic and
political polici~s in East-central Europe and·the Eastern Medit~rranean Basin.

'

